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Abstract
This paper focuses on the impact that dispersion of opinions and asymmetric information
have on turnover near releases of public information, using the probability of informed-based
trading (PIN) to proxy for information asymmetry and analysts’ forecast dispersion for differ-
ences of opinion. For earnings announcements of US ﬁrms, I ﬁnd that a one standard deviation
increase in dispersion accelerates trading, reducing the difference between turnover around and
turnover before announcements by 8.50%. A similar increase in PIN delays trading, raising
the difference by 8.29%. These results help to explain why a large number of events have high
turnover before earnings announcements relative to turnover after their release. Furthermore,
the information contained in the time-series difference between trading around and before an-
nouncementshelps to disentanglethe impact of informationasymmetryfromthat of proxies for
differences of opinion.
I also present a theoretical model in which agents who receive private information of het-
erogeneous quality, trade a stock before and after observing a public signal. This public signal
is interpreted differently across agents, leading to differences of opinion. I obtain closed-form
solutions for expected aggregate volume and its derivatives with respect to these variables,
showing that extending static models of asymmetric information is not enough to match the
empirical ﬁndings.
JEL classiﬁcation: G14, G10, G12.
Keywords: Trading volume, differences of opinion, information asymmetry.
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11 Introduction
Research on what makes investors trade can help to identify which sources of heterogeneity are
important for pricing assets and determining equilibrium levels of trading volume. Studying stock
turnover can also reveal information about the type of investors trading a particular security. Chae
(2005) shows that stock turnover decreases on days right before earnings announcements and in-
creases afterwards. However, almost 35% ofstocks on CRSPexhibit greater average turnover before
earnings announcements than during non-event days. In many cases, this increased turnover before
announcements is even higher than turnover around announcements. At ﬁrst, this might seem puz-
zling, since risk-averse, uninformed investors would prefer to trade after the release of information,
when they face a smaller probability of losing money to investors with superior information. In
this paper, I show that differences of opinion about earnings announcements help to explain these
observed differences.
Trading is generated whenever investors have different valuations about asset value. Heteroge-
neous valuations can be generated through many different channels, such as giving agents differen-
tial amounts of information about the asset, heterogeneous prior beliefs or differential interpretation
of information. Most purely-rational equilibrium models imply that trading volume is negatively
related to information asymmetry [Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 1994); Wang (1994); He and Wang
(1995); Verrecchia (2001)]. These models show that while price ﬂuctuations reﬂect changes in av-
erage beliefs, trading volume is determined by differential revisions of individual beliefs, caused by
heterogeneous priors or access to private information. Even if the average belief does not change
upon arrival of new information, implying that prices remain the same, trading can still occur when-
ever the level of investor disagreement is affected.
An alternative channel to explain trading behavior is differential interpretation of information,
by which agents disagree about how to interpret the information disclosed by public signals. Al-
though everyone observes the same information, its outcome is interpreted by some traders as good
news, while others interpret it as being bad news. In this setting, public information is still common
knowledge to investors, but each one has a different likelihood function to evaluate how public sig-
nals affect asset valuation, generated by the disagreement on the meaning of public information.1
1This is a quote from the article “Swimming against the Tide”, Business Week, Sep. 23rd, 2005: “It’s nearly im-
possible to get people to agree completely on certain topics. Who was the greatest U.S. President? Is the designated
2This assumption leads to differential updating of beliefs and to a higher trading volume, even when
all agents start out with the same prior assumptions about the asset. Imagine, for example, a corpo-
rate event that makes half the investors more optimistic and the other half equally more pessimistic
about a stock. Although aggregate beliefs stay the same, the more pessimistic agents would happily
sell their holdings to the more optimistic ones, generating trading volume without any price change.
Although this assumption is not common in rational-expectations models, it has been widely used
as an alternative way to generate trading and explain the empirical fact that in many situations stock
turnover is very high even when prices remain unchanged [Harris and Raviv (1993); Kandel and
Pearson (1995); Banerjee and Kremer (2005)].
This paper expands the literature on trading volume in two dimensions. First, I combine features
from Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) to solve a model that incorporates
both information asymmetry and differential interpretation of information, in a non-myopic econ-
omy where no single agent has a strictly better information set than others. Agents observe private
signals before the release of public information, but the precision of these signals varies across
agents. When the public signal is released, though all agents observe the same information, there is
differential interpretation about its meaning. I examine how these two features affect the difference
in trading levels before and after releases of public information, and how the timing of these trades
can be used to reveal characteristics about the information environment of a stock.
I derive analytical formulae for expected trading volume and show that higher dispersion in-
creases expected aggregate turnover both before and around announcements. An increase in infor-
mation asymmetry decreases trading by uninformed investors before announcements, but the aggre-
gate effect depends on how much extra trading is soaked up by relatively better informed investors.
After announcements, higher asymmetry unambiguously decrease aggregate trading volume.
However, simply extending three-period volume models to incorporate differential interpreta-
tions of public signals [as in Kandel and Pearson (1995)] cannot explain the time-series differences
in turnover before and turnover around earnings announcements found in the data. The model pre-
dicts that higher dispersion delays trading, as the fall in uncertainty following the release of public
information makes investors even more willing to trade on their differential beliefs. This result is
hitter rule good for baseball? Rare, medium, or well-done? Is Stock X a buy or a sell? Of course, it’s that last question
that concerns us. Equity research outﬁts’ opinions on particular issues can vary widely. That’s because analysts may use
different valuation models, industry forecasts, macroeconomic assumptions, etc., in arriving at their recommendations.”
3strongly rejected empirically and Iﬁnd the opposite sign in the data, even though the model is able to
successfully capture the patterns observed for trading levels at the time of earnings announcements.
Empirically, information asymmetry is captured by the probability of information-based trading
(PIN), developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and computed from high-frequency trading
data to provide an estimate of the amount in private information-based trading for a particular stock.
Differences of opinion are captured by analysts’ forecast dispersion, using several instruments to
ﬁlter the impact of fundamental uncertainty and information asymmetry on dispersion.
Using earnings announcements by US ﬁrms from 1984 to 2002, I ﬁnd that a one standard devia-
tion increase in dispersion accelerates trading, reducing the difference between turnover around and
turnover before announcements by 8.50%. A similar increase in information asymmetry delays trad-
ing, raising the difference by 8.29%. These results show that combining information asymmetry and
dispersion of opinion improves explanation of turnover and the time-series difference between trad-
ing before and around an announcement, being robust to the periodicity of announcements (quar-
terly or annual), different sample periods and alternative lengths of the “around”-announcements
window.
The combination of changes in dispersion and information asymmetry help to explain why some
stocks actually have higher turnover before announcements, a characteristic exhibited by about one
third of events in my sample. Any model that attempts to explain trading volume must be able
to explain this cross-sectional heterogeneity in turnover differences, on top of any effects related
to levels of turnover. This requires a fully dynamic model that allows trading at different periods
before and after releases of public signals that includes differential interpretation of public signals.
My results also provide new evidence that analyst dispersion is more closely related to differences of
opinion [Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)] than to fundamental uncertainty [Johnson (2004)].
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature, while
section 3 contains the model and analytical formulas derived for expected trading volume. Section
4 describes the hypotheses. In section 5, I discuss the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes my
ﬁndings and the appendix collects all proofs.
42 Literature Review
The mechanism behind most models attempting to explain trading is some type of heterogene-
ity that makes agents update their beliefs about asset value in different ways. Explored sources
have been ones such as agents who observe signals of different precisions [Grundy and McNichols
(1989); Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 1994); He and Wang (1995)], have access to different invest-
ment opportunities [Wang (1994)], face heterogeneous endowment shocks [Schneider (2005)] or
are overconﬁdent about the information they receive [Odean (1998)].
My paper is related to Kim and Verrecchia (1991) in the sense that traders also receive pri-
vate signals of different quality. After a (noisy) public announcement about ﬁrm value, they show
how trading volume is proportional to the absolute price change times a measure of the level of
pre-disclosure information asymmetry among investors. Trading arises due to differential belief
revisions caused by asymmetric private information among investors, with some agents having
strictly better information sets than others. Trade cannot occur without being accompanied by price
changes, a counterfactual feature of their model.
I address this concern by assuming differential interpretation of public information, in which
each agent has a unique way of processing public information [Harrison and Kreps (1978); Harris
and Raviv (1993)]. I follow the approach of Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Banerjee and Kremer
(2005) by giving each agent a different likelihood function about an informative public signal. Al-
though everyone observes the same signal, each agent interprets it uniquely, leading to differential
updating of beliefs even when all agents start out with the same priors. In contrast to these papers, I
not only explicitly model private signals, but also consider agents who incorporate the information
contained in prices to update their beliefs.
Theimpact of information asymmetry inmymodel issimilar toWang (1994). In hispaper, some
agents not only have superior information but also have access to better investment opportunities.
They can be thought of as sophisticated institutions like banks, pension funds or fund managers
who would have better access to information and a wider variety of investment opportunities not
commonly available to individual investors or those in less-developed markets. Those receiving
superior information, the informed ones, dynamically trade for informational and non-informational
reasons. Uninformed investors only accept to trade with informed ones because they know that not
all trades will be due to information shocks directly affecting the asset value. Hence, as asymmetric
5information increases, uninformed investors areless capable ofidentifying themotivation behind the
informed investors’ trades and their trading volume decreases as a consequence. A more realistic
assumption is to prevent that the information sets of certain agents are strictly superior to other,
which is done by He and Wang (1995) in a discrete-time economy with a terminal date.2 Although I
use a simpler model with only two trading dates compared to their more realistic dynamic version, in
both models agents observe private signals of heterogenous quality, but no one is perfectly informed
about the liquidation value of the asset. Investors differ by their prior expectations about public
information and by observing private information unknown to others. The ﬁnite-horizon setting
implies that trades depend not only on cash-ﬂow uncertainty but also on the number of trading
opportunities still remaining. As time elapses, more private information is revealed through prices,
inducing agents to speculate more. On the ﬂip-side, as the terminal date approaches there are fewer
trading opportunities, making it harder to unwind positions and leading to less aggressive behavior
by investors. In equilibrium, the opposing effects of these two forces determine portfolio holdings
and volume patterns.
On the empirical side, many papers have looked at trading volume using corporate earnings an-
nouncements. For example, Atiase and Bamber (1994) show evidence that trading volume reactions
around announcements are an increasing function of the level of pre-disclosure informational asym-
metry using analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for information asymmetry. Unlike their paper,
I use dispersion as a proxy for differences of opinion [Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)], ex-
amining its impact on turnover measures after controlling for the idiosyncratic risk and information
asymmetry components.
Also related is Bamber, Barron, and Stober (1997), who show that different aspects of dis-
agreement affects trading around announcements. On top of dispersion of prior beliefs, changes
in aggregate dispersion following the announcement and changes in the relative forecasts of indi-
vidual analysts are also important, but they don’t control for the level of information asymmetry
surrounding an announcement.
Closest to my work is Chae (2005), who presents evidence that trading volume reactions de-
crease with information asymmetry before scheduled announcements and increase afterwards. I
2Relaxing this assumption in a inﬁnite-horizon setting requires solving a ﬁltering-problem with an inﬁnite number of
state variables. An agent would have to forecast the forecasts of others. His own forecast of the forecast would then also
have to be forecasted by other agents, leading to the “inﬁnite regress” problem [Townsend (1983)].
6contribute by showing that differences of opinion are important to determine trading levels and,
more importantly, that the time-series difference between trading around and before announcements
helps to disentangle the impact of information asymmetry from those of proxies of differences of
opinion.
3 Model
The model is based on a generalization of Kim and Verrecchia (1991) to allow for differences of
opinion as in Kandel and Pearson (1995). Agents receive private information of heterogeneous
quality (generating asymmetric information among them) and have different opinions about public
information (leading to differential likelihood functions). The setting is fully-rational in the sense
that prices are also used to infer the true liquidation value of a risky asset.
These two sources of information generate a trade-off between a larger willingness to trade
as differences of opinion increase among investors and an increased fear of being exploited by
investors who observe more precise private signals. In equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads in
the distribution of opinions about the public signal will affect trading volume while leaving prices
unchanged.
The economy has a continuum of traders indexed by i ∈ [0,1], each having CARA utility
function with risk aversion coefﬁcient 1
λ. They are allowed to trade two assets at two trading dates
(t = 1, 2). The ﬁrst asset is a riskless security that pays no interest, while the second is a risky
stock in random supply liquidated at t = 3. The stock’s terminal value is given by a random payoff
X, which is normally distributed with mean ¯ X and precision (inverse of variance) hX. The stock
supply S is normally distributed with zero mean and precision hS, preventing agents from fully
learning the liquidation value after observing market prices.
All investors begin to trade having the same beliefs, which are equal to the unconditional mean
¯ X of the liquidation value. During the second round of trading, each agent observes a normally
distributed private signal Zi = X+εi,with εi having zero mean and precision ti. Theheterogeneous
quality of private signals, generated by each unique precision ti , creates asymmetric information
across investors in this economy.
At the beginning of the last round of trading, the company releases a public signal with informa-
tion about the liquidation value to the market. The release date of this signal is known to everyone,
7but its meaning is interpreted differently by each agent. This is the “agreeing-to-disagree” assump-
tion [see Harrison and Kreps (1978); Kandel and Pearson (1995); Wang (1998) or Banerjee and
Kremer (2005)] and is equivalent to observing a public signal E = X + v, with each investor
believing that the normally distributed shock v has identical precision hE but a different mean µi.
The different opinions about the average value of the shock v makes each agent to have their own
likelihood function when interpreting the outcome of the public signal, which in turn affects the
updating of beliefs about the true value of the asset.
Finally, at t = 3, the ﬁrm is liquidated and investors consume all of their wealth. I assume that
all random variables are independent from each other and their distributions are common knowledge
to all agents in the economy. Figure 1 summarizes the events occurring at each trading date.
Agents condition their investment decisions on observed prices, fully using market information
to update their beliefs about the asset. Because investors are not myopic and prices at t = 2 depend
on the outcome of the public signal E, they take into account not only their expectations about
the liquidation value X, but also their beliefs about E when choosing their portfolios at t = 1
. Differential interpretation of public signals, measured by the parameter µi, creates an incentive
to trade regardless of the asset’s liquidation value. This incentive depends solely on disagreement
about the meaning of the public signal. However, this willingness to speculate on differences of
opinion is counterbalanced by the fact that some traders possess an informational advantage because
they receive more precise private signals, making relatively uninformed investors less willing to
trade. These two opposing forces, differences of opinion and information asymmetry, are crucial to
determine levels of trading and its timing.
In noisy rational expectations equilibrium (NREE) models, investors make self-fulﬁlling con-
jectures about prices and one deﬁnes equilibrium as a set of allocations such that agents maximize
their utilities, their conjectures hold and markets clear. Let these linear conjectures for P1 and P2
be given by:




= φ1 + α1 ¯ X + β1
  1
0
(X + εi)di − γ1S
= φ1 + α1 ¯ X + β1X − γ1S. (1)
8and
P2 = φ2 + α2 ¯ X + β2X − γ2S + θ2E. (2)
In equilibrium, the noise contained in private signals is eliminated by the law of large numbers,
simplifying the optimization problem because agents no longer need to forecast the forecasts of
others when inferring information from prices. This is an issue with interesting implications of its
own [see for example Townsend (1983); He and Wang (1995); Makarov and Rytchkov (2006)], but
not crucial for my argument.
At t = 1, investors trade based on the information given by private signals Zi and the market
price P1. At t = 2, they additionally use the public signal E and price P2. The normalized signals
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P2 − φ2 − α2 ¯ X − θ2E
 
= X − ξ2S (4)
The precisions of the noise in variables Zi,E,q1,q2 as linear functions of X are: ti,hE, hS
(ξ1)2
and hS
(ξ2)2. In this paper I assume that linear conjectures are such that ξ1 = ξ2, i.e., the elasticity of
the signal with respect to the stock supply is the same over trading dates, making q1 = q2 = q.3
Since prices are perfectly determined by q1 and q2, the information sets of agent i at time t can






In standard fashion, I begin to solve the model by ﬁnding optimal demands at t = 2:
3I focus solelyon partial information-revealing equilibrium. Pleaserefer tosection2 of Grundy and McNichols (1989)
for a more detailed discussion about the two types of equilibrium in a model without differences of opinion.
93.1 Trading at date 2
Investor i chooses optimal stock demand mi
t at time t, by maximizing next period’s wealth Wi
t
given the information set Fi





































In view of the CARA utility function and normality of random variables, Bayes’ theorem ensure
that traders update their beliefs about the liquidation value with:
Ei
 


















  = K2i = hX + ti + hE +
hS
ξ2 . (7)
At t = 2, differences in how investors estimate the liquidation value are due to private infor-
mation heterogeneity and dispersion of opinions. Here, I assume there is no overconﬁdence by
agents (i.e., hE is constant), but they are allowed to disagree about the interpretation of public in-
formation. When a ﬁrm releases its earnings, the precision of beliefs rises by the same amount hE
for all agents, reducing total uncertainty. However, the effect of this announcement on individual
valuations depends both on how optimistic an agent is (i.e., how negative µi is), and on the preci-
sion of the public signal relative to his prior’s precision (i.e., how large hE is relative to K1i). The
assumption of homogeneous precisions about the noise contained in these signals is important to
eliminate any effects caused by overconﬁdence [Odean (1998)], which would affect asset returns
and, consequentially, trading volume.
Furthermore, the release of public information reduces overall uncertainty and the gap between
uninformed and informed traders’ precision in estimating asset values. This can be seen from equa-
tion (7), which shows how a release of public information increases the precision about liquidation
value’s beliefs by hE. This increase however, relative to ex-ante information, is relatively larger for
uninformed investors.
The following theorem summarizes equilibrium at t = 2.
10Theorem 1 Equilibrium price and demands conditional on the public signal at t = 2 are charac-
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0 µidi, t =
  1
0 tidi, K2i ≡ hX + ti + hE + λ2t2hS and K2 ≡
  1
0 K2idi = hX +
  1
0 tidi + hE + λ2t2hS.
As expected, prices increase with X and decrease with aggregate supply S. The distribution
of opinions in this economy affects prices through the term µ, which captures the average opinion
about the public signal. When this parameter is greater than zero, investors on average infer a
smaller realization of the liquidation value X from the earnings announcement, becoming relatively
more pessimistic about it. Although prices are unaffected by differences of opinion when µ is
zero, demands are still sensitive to individual beliefs and depend on how much they differ from the
average. The more precise public signals are, the more weight is given to their outcome, leading to
a higher impact from differences of opinion on investor holdings.
3.2 Trading at date 1
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The following theorem summarizes equilibrium at t = 1.






































0 µidi, t =
  1
0 tidi, K1i ≡ hX +ti+λ2t2hS and K1 ≡
  1
0 K1idi = hX +t+λ2t2hS.
Equation (12) allows us to discuss the impact of dispersion of opinions and information asym-
metry on holdings. The higher the precision of private information, the more weight is given to the
private shock εi. The impact of differences of opinion from the average consensus is a function of
the aggregate uncertainty in the economy at t = 1.
3.3 Public Announcements, Price Reactions and Trading Volume
In this section, I simplify the model to analyze how changes in information asymmetry and dif-
ferences of opinion affect aggregate volume, assuming there are just two classes of investors, the
informed and uninformed ones. The informed investors comprise a proportion γ of all investors,
have beliefs µI about the mean of the public signal noise and precision tI on the private signal
received at t = 1. The uninformed, in proportion 1 − γ, have beliefs µU about the public signal
and precision tU. The private signal observed by the informed agents is more precise than the one
possessed by the uninformed, such that tI > tU. Finally, I also assume, to simplify calculations,
that the average opinion about the public signal’s noise is zero (i.e., µ = 0), implying that dispersion
of beliefs has no impact on prices.
















K2idi = hX + tU + γ (tI − tU) + λ2 [tU + γ (tI − tU)]hS + hE. (16)
The corollary below summarizes prices and holdings:
12Corollary 1 Suppose investors belong to just two classes: the informed and uninformed. The in-
formed investors, in proportion γ, are characterized by beliefs µI and precision tI of the private
signal. The remaining (1 − γ) proportion of uninformed investors have beliefs µU and precision








































When an investor is more optimistic about earnings (µU > 0 > µI), she trades on this belief by
purchasing relatively more of the asset at date 1. Since this small ex-ante optimism about earnings
implies, by construction, a higher ex-post pessimism about the asset, she reverts her strategy and sell
more at date 2, increasing trading volume around announcements accordingly. The private signal
received at t = 1 also provides investors with information about earnings, but each investor has its
own interpretation because of the µi parameter, which affects holdings in equilibrium.



















= λ|−K2µi − (ti − t)(P2 − P1)|. (19)
Trading volume around announcements is linear on absolute price changes if there is no dispersion
of opinions. However, when agents do disagree about the interpretation of public information, this
linearity breaks down, in contrast to Proposition 2 of Kim and Verrecchia (1991) but similar to Kim
and Verrecchia (1994). Here, differences of opinion affect volume even under symmetric informa-
tion (i.e., when tU = tI = t). If earnings announcements are useless to convey new information
to investors (hE = 0), there are no price reactions, but agents still change their portfolios due to
disagreement about the meaning of the public signal itself.
Since holdings are normally distributed, we can use the following result to compute expected
volume:











13with n(.) being the probability density function of a standard normal distribution and Φ(.) its cu-
mulative density function. The next result summarizes expected trading volume before and around
announcements.
Theorem 3 Let agent i have beliefs µi about the mean of public signal’s noise, and ti be the pre-
cision of the private signal. Furthermore, let the average belief be µ = 0 and t the aggregate
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= λ(ti − t)σ(P2 − P1).
It follows from Equation (22) that expected volume is a function of the mean and standard
deviation of the change in holdings over time. As fundamental risk grows (i.e., hX falls), investors
are more worried about information asymmetry since the relative difference in the quality of private
signals rises. This reduces speculation based on differences of opinion, leading to smaller trading
volume.
Now, I present derivatives of expected volume given mean-preserving spreads in asymmetric
information or differences of opinion. These spreads are such that a decrease in the quality of
information tU observed by uninformed traders is matched by a proportional increase in tI for
14informed ones, in order to keep the aggregate informativeness of private signals constant. It is
important to keep t constant to ﬁx the average uncertainty level in the economy, keeping prices
constant and allowing me to focus on relative differences between classes.
Theorem 4 Let agent i have belief µi about the public signal’s noise mean and let ti be the belief
about the private signal’s noise precision. Furthermore, let the average belief be µ = 0 and the
aggregate informativeness t of private signals a positive constant. Then, the sign of the derivative
of expected volume with respect to µi is positive if and only if µi is positive, both before announce-
ments and around announcements. Furthermore, the derivative of expected volume with respect to
the precision of private signals ti is always positive both before and around announcements. The
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V ar(P2 − P1) > 0 for all ti > 0. (26)
Although the theorem above computes derivatives for individual investors, empirical researchers
most of the time only have access to aggregate trading volume measures. Thus, it is crucial to derive
how increases in dispersion affect aggregate expected volume.
Theorem 5 Let µU deﬁne the belief about mean public signals noise by uninformed investors
and µI the equivalent belief for informed investors such that the average belief is zero, i.e., µ ≡
γµI + (1 − γ)µU = 0. Then, a mean-preserving rise in differences of opinion, increases trading
volume both before announcements and afterwards. Furthermore, a mean-preserving increase in
information asymmetry decreases trading volume after announcements.
15An increase in dispersion is equivalent to an increase in |µU − µI|.4 As seen from equation
(A.35) and (A.36) in the appendix, we can observe how higher dispersion leads to higher trading
at both trading dates. They also show that the magnitude of this increased trading depends on
information asymmetry, which has the interesting empirical implication that trading volume varies
asymmetrically with dispersion. The theorem crucially depends on the result that the cumulative
probability function of a normal variable is a monotonically increasing function of its mean. On
the other hand, when I compute the total differential with respect to information asymmetry, the
resulting formulas are functions of the probability density functions instead, preventing me from
ﬁnding a clear sign for the derivative of total volume before announcements. However, it can still
be shown that trading volume after announcements is unambiguously lower following an increase
in information asymmetry.
Given these results, it is important to outline some limitations of the model. The three-period
CARA setting imposes unrealistic constraints upon agents, who might prefer to smooth their trading
both before and after announcements as uncertainty is resolved [see for example He and Wang
(1995) or Makarov and Rytchkov (2006)]. Furthermore, agents only trade in two periods, with
volume at t = 1 depending on the initial allocations of each investor. In a dynamic model, expected
volume at t = 1 would certainly be higher due to a change in holdings at t = 0.
Another important assumption is that differences of opinion are constant over time. For ex-
ample, companies might release their earnings while, at the same time, give further clariﬁcation to
the market on how particular ﬁgures have been calculated, reducing differences of interpretation.
Although this would affect the magnitude of the derivatives above, it is unlikely to change their
signs.
Regardless of these limitations, the model captures the main motives for trading and expands
the literature by incorporating more realistic features than previous ones. In the next sections I
test the model on stock turnover near earnings announcements and show that while the model can
reasonably match patterns associated with trading levels, it cannot match the evidence found in
the data for the sensitivity of the difference in trading around and trading before announcements
with respect to differences of opinions. The empirical ﬁndings I present in the next sections also
4As µ = 0, whenever one class of investors has positive expectations about the signal, the other has negative expec-
tations by construction.
16illustrate the usefulness of the model to examine how stock turnover relates to pre-event measures
of asymmetric information and differences of opinion.
4 Hypotheses
In light of these ideas, corporate earnings announcements constitute prime candidates for empirical
investigation, since they convey important information about ﬁrm value at scheduled dates known
by all traders in advance. In particular, I test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Trading volume before earnings announcements increases with dispersion of opin-
ions.
The larger is the disagreement among investors the more willing to speculate on the outcome of
announcements they become. Although agents are well aware that other market participants might
have access to more precise information, they are still willing to bet on their individual beliefs
regardless of possible informational disadvantages. Ultimately, this leads to an increase in trading
volume before announcements following rises in dispersion, as shown by equation (A.35) in the
appendix.
Hypothesis 2 Trading volume around earnings announcements increases with dispersion of opin-
ions.
Equation (A.36) in the appendix shows that a rise in dispersion always increases trading volume
after announcements. Aggregate uncertainty decreases from t = 1 to t = 2 because extra informa-
tion is released to the market. Agents are therefore more willing to trade upon differences in beliefs
as time elapses and uncertainty about the liquidation value is reduced.
A positive relationship between turnover around earnings announcements and analyst forecast
dispersion has been explored many times before [Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) or Bamber, Bar-
ron, and Stober (1997)], but Icontrol for differences ininformation asymmetry and provide evidence
that the magnitude of this effect itself depends on information asymmetry. This illustrates that dis-
persion of analysts’ forecasts must be used with care if one does not account for adverse selection
costs.
17Hypothesis 3 Investors trade less before announcements if information asymmetry is high.
At the ﬁrst trading date, equation (24) shows that an increase in the quality of private signals
always increases expected trading volume, regardless of whether the investor is better or worse
informed than the average. An increase in information asymmetry is characterized by a fall in
the quality of uninformed agents’ private signals and a proportional rise in the quality of private
signals observed by informed agents. This fall on the uninformed’s signal quality makes them
trade less (the “fear of trading” effect), while the corresponding increase on the informed’s signal
quality makes these investors trade more. The information gap between informed and uninformed
traders determines whether aggregate trading volume goes up or down, and explains why its sign
is ambiguous following a mean-preserving rise in information asymmetry. This result may explain
why stock turnover before announcements can be actually lower after decreases in information
asymmetry, exactly the results found by Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2005) for international ﬁrms
that cross-list their shares in US stock exchanges via American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).
Chae (2005) essentially tests this hypothesis, investigating turnover reactions rather than levels
of trading; using market capitalization, analyst coverage and average bid-ask spreads as proxies for
information asymmetry. In this paper, I use a more direct proxy for asymmetry borrowed from the
microstructure literature, the probability of information-based trading (PIN) [Easley, Kiefer, and
O’Hara (1996), Vega (2006)] and show that it is negatively related to turnover before announce-
ments.
Hypothesis 4 Investors trade less around announcements when information asymmetry is high.
Equation (26) shows that a fall in the quality of private signals always decreases expected vol-
ume around announcements. The change in aggregate expected trading volume depends on whether,
at the margin, uninformed investors are more or less sensitive than informed ones after an increase
in asymmetry. Whether it decreases or increases trading around announcements across ﬁrms is for
the data to uncover. In particular, I use PIN to test this hypothesis, showing that turnover levels after
announcements are negatively related to asymmetry around earnings announcements.
None of the four hypotheses say anything about the timing of trades, i.e., the trading date at
which investors place their orders. The scheduled release of public information affects investors’
18trading decisions, who shift their trading depending on information asymmetry and dispersion. The
model allow us to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 Turnover around announcements increases relative to turnover before announce-
ments when information asymmetry and dispersion are high.
Investors have more incentives to wait for the release of public signals when information asym-
metry is high, since these signals reduce the wedge between informed and uninformed investors.
The fear of trading with informed agents makes uninformed ones prefer to wait for as much infor-
mation as possible, leading to relatively more trading around announcements compared to before
announcements when there is more information asymmetry among agents. If agents disagree about
how to interpret the information released by public announcements, the model implies that they will
speculate more on their differential interpretations after the public signal is released. The reduction
in uncertainty due to the release of public information makes everyone more willing to trade on their
differential valuations, even though an investor is aware she could be trading with better-informed
ones.
In the empirical section, I show evidence against the hypothesis that higher dispersion delays
trading until after the announcement. In fact, there is strong evidence in the opposite direction,
in the sense that higher dispersion accelerates trading. The assumption that investors can only
trade once before the public signal is released imposes big constraints on how investors can react
to differences of opinion, since holdings at t = 1 affect volume before and around announcements.
If the announcement itself conveys information that reduces the disagreement of interpretations
among investors, it might also lead to relatively less trading afterwards. The private signal observed
at t = 1 provides information about the earnings announcement itself. As these earnings also affect




The data comprise all annual earnings announcements from the Institutional Brokers Estimate Sys-
tem (I/B/E/S) for the period running from 1984 to 2002. These events are matched to with CRSP
to get price and volume data. I further restrict the sample using two criteria. First, I only include
I/B/E/S events with primary annual earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts made by at least three ana-
lysts. Second, I remove forecasts made after the reporting date of earnings and only include ﬁrms
with at least 30 days of return data available during the estimation window period covering t = −80
to t = −11 trading days before the announcement.
I measure dispersion as the standard deviation of unadjusted analyst forecasts reported by
I/B/E/S divided by average stock price observed during the estimation period [Qu, Starks, and Yan
(2004)]. Given the biases in I/B/E/S data uncovered by Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), I
use the Unadjusted Summary ﬁle to compute dispersion measures.5 The implicit assumption is that
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts captures investors’ differences of opinion.
Dispersion is also affected by the amount of pre-announcement information known by agents
and the fundamental uncertainty about the stock. In the model, dispersion of forecasts among in-
vestors is caused by two factors: differential updating of beliefs after observing private signals and
the heterogeneous opinions that each investor has about the outcome of the public signal.
More generally, the level of uncertainty about liquidation values and the relative precision of
private information signals affect forecasts [see for example Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia
(1995)]. Given a ﬁxed value of private signals’ average uncertainty, uninformed investors will trade
less as information asymmetry increases to avoid being exploited by others with access to more
precise private information. Empirically, I proxy for this adverse-selection cost with the probability
of information-based trading (PIN) in the calendar year prior to the reporting date of earnings. This
measure was developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and is computed from a structural
market-microstructure model based on a stock’s total number of daily buy and sell transactions in
a given calendar year. It has been used to explain many information-related effects observed in
5Qualitative results are the same regardless of whether data come from Summary or Detailed ﬁles, though statistical
signiﬁcance decreases a little when using the former.
20stock returns and volatility series [see for example Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002); Vega
(2006)] and it serves as my control for the private information component embedded in analysts’
forecast dispersion.6 The exclusion of NASDAQ-listed companies reduces the number of PIN-
matched events by more than 40%, biasing the sample towards larger and more widely covered
ﬁrms, leaving a total of 20,403 earnings announcements events from 2,730 ﬁrms. Following Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2000), I also use the logarithm of market capitalization and analyst coverage as
further controls for information asymmetry. Finally, I reduce the impact of outliers in turnover and
dispersion measures by “winsorizing” them at the 1% level.7
In Panel A of Table 1, I show descriptive statistics of events with available PIN estimates.
Announcements rarely exhibit high levels of disagreement, with mean dispersion being equal to
0.56% of share price and standard deviation equal to 1.22%. Most stocks in the sample also exhibit
small values for PIN but its distribution exhibits less kurtosis and skewness than what is found for
dispersion. The correlations among explanatory variables are in line with prior expectations: Panel
B shows that PIN is negatively related to ﬁrm size and analyst coverage, matching the intuition that
investors face a smaller probability of trading with informed investors for stocks with higher degrees
of public information disclosure. Dispersion is highly correlated with stock volatility, showing
the importance of controlling for fundamental uncertainty when attempting to evaluate the impact
of dispersion of opinions. The table also shows that higher analyst coverage is associated to a
smaller dispersion of forecasts. However, unreported results show that once we control for ﬁrm size
(like Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)), there is a negative correlation between residual coverage and
forecast dispersion. This is evidence in favor of higher coverage reducing information asymmetry
and increasing disagreement among investors.
5.2 Event-study and Regression Analysis
The hypotheses are tested on average stock turnover before earnings announcements, around earn-
ings announcements and the difference between the two.8 The distributional characteristics of raw
turnover and the fact that it is bounded below at zero cause large departures from normality. Follow-
6Data with estimated PIN measures of NYSE/AMEX common stocks from 1983 to 2003 can be obtained from Soeren
Hvidkjaer’s site at http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/data.htm
7Results are qualitatively the same with a 5% or 10% cut-off level.
8I use the terms Around and After interchangeably.
21ing Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Iapply the logarithmic transformation tomake the turnover distribution
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Figure 2 shows large differences in turnover reactions between ﬁrms with and without PIN
estimates. It contains the relative amount of trading in each event-day compared to benchmark
levels of trading when sample is split according to whether PIN is available or not. I use a 70-
day estimation window as benchmark turnover and compute daily abnormal reactions during the
[-10,10] days period near announcements. Unreported statistics show that ﬁrms without PIN tend
to be smaller, less liquid, more volatile and to have a smaller analyst following than those with PIN.
Firms with PIN have higher levels of abnormal trading before announcements, but after earnings
are released the increase in turnover is much larger for ﬁrms without PIN. The reduction in cross-
sectional variability caused by the restriction that ﬁrms must have PIN estimates makes testing the
hypotheses more difﬁcult, but results are still economically signiﬁcant.
Panel C of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for log turnover measures. Average turnover
is larger both before announcements and around announcements when compared to the estimation
period. The skewness and kurtosis are much closer to normal values showing that the log transfor-
mation takes care of concerns about the statistical distribution of the dependent variables. Although
averages relative to pre-event daily turnover may not seem economically large, they are equivalent
to a 1.2% increase on the days before the announcement and a 35.9% on the days around the an-
nouncement. Both increases are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The increase in turnover
9Results are the same when I change the deﬁnition of the “around announcements” window to [−1,1] days.
22before announcements for ﬁrms with PIN estimates contrasts with the -3.82% found for the whole
sample, being close to the one reported by Chae (2005). The difference relative to positive value
found in the sample constrained by PIN availability can be explained by the absence of NASDAQ
ﬁrms, which have turnover before announcements 4.73% lower, on average, than during the esti-
mation period. The distribution of the differences in turnover is highly skewed (equal to 2.9 for
the whole sample) and explains how the fact that almost 30% of all earning announcements ex-
hibit larger turnover before versus turnover around announcements are compatible with the results
seen on Figure 2. During the empirical analysis, I perform robustness tests to account for possible
selection-bias due to this constraint due to PIN availability and show that my results are unchanged.
I test hypotheses 1 and 3 by looking at how turnover before earnings announcements is affected
by proxies for dispersion and asymmetric information. Table 2 presents results for different spec-
iﬁcations. The ﬁrst hypothesis states that trading before announcements increases with dispersion
of opinions. The univariate regression coefﬁcient of turnover on dispersion equals 0.39 but is not
statistically signiﬁcant which, at ﬁrst, is evidence against the hypothesis. However, once I control
for information asymmetry using PIN, dispersion coefﬁcients increase and become statistically sig-
niﬁcant. This shows the relevance of controlling for the private information component embedded
in analyst forecast dispersion, specially if researchers intend to use it as a proxy for differences of
opinion.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that trading before announcements is negatively related to information
asymmetry and I cannot reject it at the 99% conﬁdence level across all speciﬁcations. We can also
observe that controlling for the amount of news is very important to explain trading levels. Using
average absolute abnormal returns to proxy for ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and absolute abnormal
market returns to proxy for market-wide information, we can see that both are positively related to
turnover and highly signiﬁcant, similar to previous ﬁndings [Chae (2005)]. The most signiﬁcant
drivers of trading volume are the amount of news hitting the stock during the event, either ﬁrm-
related or market-related.
I also test if the relationship between dispersion and turnover is concave in PIN, i.e., the larger
information asymmetry levels are for a given stock, the smaller impact dispersion has on turnover.
This conjecture cannot be rejected in the data, with the coefﬁcient on the DISP*PIN cross-product
being equal to -42.62 and statistically signiﬁcant.
23Adding ﬁrm size and analyst coverage as additional controls do not affect the signiﬁcance of
dispersion and PIN, although estimated PIN parameters do become smaller in magnitude. This de-
crease in PIN coefﬁcients is expected, since these control variables also capture part of information
asymmetry differences across ﬁrms. The positive coefﬁcients for analyst coverage in columns 6 to 8
are associated both with less information asymmetry and more dispersion of forecasts, in line with
Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) and Brown and Hillegeist (2003).
The information contained in announcements also affects trading volume after the release of
signals. I use abnormal turnover around announcements as the dependent variable to test hypotheses
2 and 4. The public information release helps to level off differences of information across investors,
enticing them to wait for its outcome before placing their order. In Table 3, I re-estimate regressions.
If we look at the coefﬁcient estimated for dispersion in column 6 of table 3, it is equal to 6.06. This
supports hypothesis 2, which states that turnover around announcements is also positively related to
dispersion.10
Furthermore, just as predicted in hypothesis 4, turnover around announcements is negatively
related to PIN, having a coefﬁcient equal to -3.39. Although the derivatives of expected turnover
with respect to information asymmetry depend on chosen parameters, this negative signal gives evi-
dence that the decrease on uninformed traders’ demands is larger than the increase on uninformed’s
demands following an increase in asymmetry.
The results above support the claim that analyst dispersion measures differences of opinion
rather than uncertainty. Higher uncertainty about asset value reduces trading and if dispersion was
truly a proxy for uncertainty, we would not have found the estimated coefﬁcients.
The difference in parameters estimated for turnover before and turnover around announcements
suggests that they arenot only related tolevels of trading, but also tothe timing oftrades with respect
to releases of public information. This forms the basis of hypothesis 5 and I provide evidence to
support it by running regressions using the difference between turnover around and turnover before
announcements as the dependent variable. Results in Table 4 show that the difference in turnover
is positively related to information asymmetry, but negatively related to dispersion. This provides a
new way to disentangle the relationship between differences of opinion and information asymmetry
and adds another feature that must be captured by trading behavior models. They should not only
10I use the speciﬁcation contained in column 6 as the main focus of analysis unless otherwise noted.
24match cross-sectional differences in levels of trading, but also time-series differences.
Higher asymmetry increases the fear of trading with uninformed investors and decreases trading
in both periods as can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. Since public signals reduce the wedge between
informed and uninformed investors, hypothesis 5 predicts relatively more trading after announce-
ments for higher levels of asymmetry. The estimated PIN coefﬁcient is equal to 0.37 and supports
this claim, being statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Hypothesis 5 also states that there should be relatively more trading after announcements when
disagreement among investors is high. The estimated coefﬁcient associated to dispersion equals -
1.70, which rejects the model’s prediction. Higher dispersion of opinions in fact accelerates trading,
making investors speculate on their beliefs before earnings are released. This provides further evi-
dence in favor of seeing forecast dispersion as a measure of differences of opinion [Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina (2002)] rather than a measure of fundamental uncertainty [Johnson (2004)].
After observing these results, the natural question is whether changes in PIN and dispersion lead
to economically signiﬁcant changes in turnover. In Table 5, I take estimated parameters and show
the impact on expected turnover before announcements, after announcements and their difference,
following a one standard deviation increase in three variables: PIN, dispersion and analyst coverage.
In Panel A, we see that differences of opinion have a smaller impact on turnover than information
asymmetry. Increasing dispersion raises daily turnover before announcements by 0.12 standard de-
viations (an increase of 6.49% relative to its average), corresponding to an extra $7.88mi in dollar
volume for the average ﬁrm during the 8-day period before the event. The same one standard devia-
tion variation in PIN reduces turnover by 0.13 standard deviations (equivalent to a -6.98% decrease
relative to its unconditional mean). In Panel B, I repeat these calculations but examine turnover
around announcements. A one-sigma increase in PIN decreases turnover by 0.1 standard deviations
(-6.76% of its mean), less than the reduction found before announcements. Furthermore, following
a one standard deviation increase in dispersion, turnover around announcements decrease by 0.09
standard deviations (5.98% of its mean), also less than the variation observed before announce-
ments.
I examine whether these differences across time are economically signiﬁcant in Panel C, where I
compute the effect on the difference between turnover around and before the event. A one standard
deviation increase in PIN makes the difference in turnover go up by 0.04 standard deviations on
25average, a number seemingly small at ﬁrst but that corresponds to a 8.29% increase relative to the
mean difference. Similar variation is found for a change in dispersion, which decreases turnover by
0.04 standard deviations and corresponds to -8.50% of the mean turnover difference for the whole
sample. These results are strong evidence that releases of public information have a signiﬁcant
impact on the timing of trades and these results follow the direction predicted by hypothesis 5.
Increasing analyst coverage by one standard deviation has the largest impact on trading levels,
raising turnover both before and around announcements by about 15-20%, but it does not seem to
affect the timing of trades, with the -0.108 estimated coefﬁcient not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
A crucial issue is whether the results above are driven by sample-selection bias due to the avail-
ability of PIN measures. Although in Column (8) of Tables 2-4 I estimate regressions using a
dummy variable controlling for the availability of PIN, the PIN sample might be a non-random
sample of US ﬁrms. This would lead to the classic sample selection problem described by Heck-
man (1979), who shows how OLS estimates are biased if stock characteristics conditional on PIN
availability are different than for the average US company. Out of the 28,628 earnings announce-
ments extracted from I/B/E/S, data on PIN are available for only 19,690 events. Those excluded
from the regressions include 3,627 announcements from NYSE/AMEX-listed ﬁrms (19.15% of the
total number of excluded events) and 17,891 from NASDAQ-listed ﬁrms (the remaining 80.85%).
Unavailability of PIN estimates for NYSE/AMEX-listed ﬁrms is mainly caused by data constraints
imposed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) to ensure reliable estimation of the model. More
important, the exclusion of NASDAQ-listed ﬁrms occurs mainly due to the market microstructure of
the exchange. The structural model in Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) is based on an uninformed
market-maker setting that is much closer to the trading environment seem on the NYSE and AMEX,
with PIN estimates only being computed for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms.
In Panel A of Table 6 I test the difference in average turnover measures, dispersion and size
between PIN and no-PIN ﬁrms. Firms with PIN estimates available have smaller turnover before,
turnover around and turnover difference, but tend to be smaller in size and to have less dispersion
of opinions. All these differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. These differences
indicate a potential selection bias if we only use PIN ﬁrms in the regressions and extrapolate the
conclusions to average US ﬁrm.
I control for possible selection-bias using the Heckman (1979) two-step model. The ﬁrst-step
26comprises in estimating a probit regression on the likelihood that a ﬁrm has PIN estimates available
in the previous year. As controls, I include analyst forecast dispersion, market capitalization, analyst
coverage, ﬁrm-age (deﬁned as current year minus the ﬁrst year of stock data available in CRSP),
institutional ownership (fraction of the ﬁrm owned by institutional investors based on 13f Hold-
ings data), number of institutional investors, the standard deviation of returns during the 200-day
estimation period, aggregate stock market turnover and a dummy variable controlling for Nasdaq
membership (based on CRSP’s HEXCD variable). The second-step comprises of estimating the
speciﬁcation in Column (6) of Tables 2 to 4, but now including the Mills ratio (λ) as an additional
variable to control for selection bias. In Panel B of Table 6, I present the results for both steps. As
expected, the likelihood of having PIN estimates available is positively related with size, dispersion,
analyst coverage, ﬁrm age and the fraction of institutional investors’ ownership. We also ﬁnd that
Nasdaq membership and the standard deviation of returns is negatively related to PIN-availability.
The Pseudo-R2 of this regression is equal to 63.42%, displaying a good degree of explanation.
In the second-step, the statistical signiﬁcance of the Mills ratio shows how selection-bias is an
issue. However, all the signs estimated for PIN and dispersion remain signiﬁcant and with the same
signs as before. For example, when we compare the regression for the difference in stock turnover
with the one estimated in Column (6) of Table 4, we can see that the estimated parameter for PIN
decreases from 0.368 to 0.327, while the coefﬁcient for dispersion goes from -1.705 to -1.635.
These estimates show that the results are not driven by sample selection.
5.3 Additional Robustness Checks
I now subject the results to a number of robustness checks to verify that they are not due to a par-
ticular sample or methodology I use. I repeat the analysis using quarterly earnings announcements,
a different estimation-period window, raw turnover measures instead of log turnover and, ﬁnally, I
split the sample in half.
In Panel A of table 7, I estimate regressions using quarterly earnings announcements, changing
the estimation period window to [-30,-11] days before events to avoid overlaps with announcements
in the previous quarter. Using quarterly data increase the number of events and slightly decrease the
number of ﬁrmsin the sample. The parameters for PIN and dispersion are signiﬁcant in all cases and
yield similar qualitative results to estimates based on annual data. Most important for robustness,
27parameters for PIN and dispersion in the turnover differences regression (the “Diff” column) are
remarkably similar to the ones estimated in column (6) of Table 4.
In all previous regressions, I’ve used [-2,2] days around an announcement as the “Around”
event-period. As an additional check, I re-estimate regressions using [-1,1] as the length of the
“Around” period. Results, shown in Panel B of table 7, are broadly similar to the baseline regres-
sions.
Finally, I split the annual events sample in two halves: one with data from 1984–1993 and the
other from 1994-2002. Results in Table 8 show that the signiﬁcance of results comes mostly from
the second half of the sample. Thelarger R2s found for all three different dependent variables during
the 1994–2002 period can be explained by greater attention being given to analyst recommendations
following the spread of the Internet and improvements on how information is propagated across
ﬁnancial markets.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines turnover measures to quantify the impact of differences of opinion and infor-
mation asymmetry on trading behavior. In particular, I try to explain why many ﬁrms have high
turnover before earnings announcements relative to turnover at the time they are released. At ﬁrst,
this might seem puzzling, since risk-averse, uninformed investors would prefer to trade relatively
more after the release of information, when they face a smaller probability losing money to in-
vestors with access to superior information. However, if investors disagree about the meaning of
public information, their willingness to trade before announcements increases. This corresponds to
the “agreeing-to-disagree” assumption [see Harrison and Kreps (1978), Kandel and Pearson (1995)
or Banerjee and Kremer (2005)] and I use it to explain the cross-sectional turnover differences,
showing not only that levels but also the timing of trades are affected by disagreement in interpret-
ing public information.
I propose a rational-expectations model in which agents who receive private information of
asymmetric quality trade a risky security before and after observing a public signal. I derive analyt-
ical formulas for expected trading volume and show that higher dispersion increases expected aggre-
gate turnover both before announcements and around them. An increase in information asymmetry
decreases trading before announcements by uninformed investors, but the aggregate effect depends
28on how much extra trading is soaked up by relatively better informed ones. After announcements,
increases in asymmetry unambiguously decrease aggregate trading volume.
Empirically, I use earnings announcements data of US ﬁrms to test predictions about stock
turnover before and around announcements. I ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in disper-
sion accelerates trading, reducing the difference between turnover around and turnover before an-
nouncements by 8.50%. A similar increase in PIN delays trading, raising the difference by 8.29%.
Examining cross-sectional differences in turnover over time uncover patterns that must be explained
by trading behavior models and provides researchers with a new way to test the usefulness of prox-
ies for information asymmetry and differences of opinion. Simply extending three-period volume
models to incorporate differential interpretations of public signals (similar to Kandel and Pearson
(1995)) cannot explain the time-series differences in turnover before and turnover around earnings
announcements.
My results provides new evidence that analysts’ forecast dispersion is more closely related to
differences of opinion [Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)] rather than to a measure of funda-
mental uncertainty [Johnson (2004)] and are robust to the periodicity of announcements (quarterly
or annual), sample periods and length of the “Around” announcements period window.
The combination of changes in dispersion and information asymmetry help to explain why some
stocks actually have higher abnormal turnover before announcements, a characteristic of about one
third of events in my sample. Any model that attempts to explain trading volume must be able to
explain these cross-sectional differences in turnover, on top of any explanation about trading levels,
i.e. the timing of trades is also important.
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Proof of Theorem 2. By the properties of the log-normal distribution, the conditional expectation




































In the expression above, we are only left with uncertainty from P2. Since agents are no longer
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with K1i ≡ V ar(X | Zi,P1) = hX + ti + λ2t2hS.
31Omitting the terms unrelated to mi









































































































hEK2i . However, since this multiple is only a function
of the variance, which is a constant that doesn’t depend on mi
1, we can ignore the whole integral for
the analysis of optimal holdings at t = 1.
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K1idi = hX + t + λ2t2hS and measures the average precision of beliefs about
the liquidation value at t = 1.
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Using the linear conjecture in equation (1) we match coefﬁcients and obtain:
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= λ[−K2µi − (ti − t)(P2 − P1)]. (A.18)
Before we compute the mean and variance, note that we can characterize price change and its
moments by:
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> 0 ⇐⇒ µi > 0. (A.28)
Now for the derivative of expected trading volume before announcements with respect to the
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The sign of the derivative above depends on how the standard deviation of the change in hold-
ings, mi
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> 0 for all ti > 0.








   






















   
 




































> 0 ⇐⇒ µi > 0. (A.32)







   





































   









V ar(P2 − P1) > 0 for all ti > 0. (A.33)
Proof of Theorem 5. An increase in dispersion that keeps ﬁxed the average belief µ is such that:
dµ = γdµI + (1 − γ)dµU = 0




Combining equations (23) and (A.34), the total differential of aggregate expected volume before















































> 0 ⇔ µU > µI. (A.35)















































> 0 ⇔ µU > µI. (A.36)
36The proof for the derivative with respect to information asymmetry is computed in similar fash-
ion. An increase in tU such average precision t is constant is given by:
dt = γdtI + (1 − γ)dtU = 0
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But note that since σU
2 > σI
2, it is sufﬁcient to check whether (µU)
2 < (µI)
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40Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This tablereportsdescriptivestatistics ofannualearningsannouncementsin the1984–2002periodonI/B/E/S
with available PIN estimates. Panel A lists ﬁrm characteristics, Panel B their correlations and Panel C statis-
tics of turnovermeasures. PIN represents the probabilityof information-basedtrading,Dispersion is the stan-
dard deviation of analyst forecasts as a percentage of share price, Size reports statistics for average market
capitalization in millions of dollars and Analysts represents analyst coverage. E(r) is the average percentage
daily returns, σ(r) their standarddeviationand Turnoverdaily percentageturnoverduringthe periodbetween
t = −80 and t = −11 days before the event. In Panel B, Coverageuses residual analyst coveragewhen com-
puting correlations. In Panel C, I report statistics for Turnover transformed with the log(0.001+x) function.
Before represents abnormal trading during the [-10,-3] days period before the announcement, Around stands
for the [-2,2] days period around the announcementand Difference is equal to (Around–Before).
Panel A: Explanatory Variables
Statistic PIN Dispersion Size Analysts E(r) σ(r) Turnover
Mean 0.171 0.56 3,441 12.25 0.085 2.473 0.341
Median 0.166 0.21 959 10.00 0.088 2.137 0.262
St. Dev. 0.055 1.22 9,832 8.19 0.337 1.385 0.294
Skewness 0.66 5.13 10.10 1.00 0.21 3.04 3.38
Kurtosis 3.93 32.61 167.50 3.47 13.21 25.84 22.71
Min 0.000 0.00 6 3.00 -2.749 0.321 0.044
Max 0.551 9.05 308,939 50.00 6.279 30.534 3.501
Panel B: Correlations
Corr(↓,→) PIN Dispersion Size Analysts E(r) σ(r) Turnover
PIN 1
Dispersion 0.162 1
Size -0.328 -0.100 1
Analysts -0.411 -0.086 0.417 1
E(r) 0.004 -0.059 0.016 -0.025 1
σ(r) 0.119 0.417 -0.099 -0.222 0.007 1
Turnover -0.103 0.054 -0.022 0.045 0.010 0.408 1
Panel C: Log turnover Measures
Variable N Mean Median St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
Estimation 20,403 -1.643 -1.604 0.802 -0.293 3.484 -4.034 1.028
Before 20,403 -1.616 -1.580 0.899 -0.337 3.652 -5.440 1.541
Around 20,403 -1.370 -1.346 0.938 -0.232 3.441 -5.269 2.073
Difference 20,403 0.245 0.215 0.549 0.338 4.509 -2.753 3.739
41Table 2: Turnover Before Earnings Announcements
This table reports results of OLS regressions of turnover before earnings announcements events taken from I/B/E/S in the 1984–2002 period. The dependent
variable is average log turnover on the [-10,-3] days period before the announcement. Under the Sign column I show the predicted signs for each variable. DPIN
is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has a PIN estimate for the previous year. PIN is the probability of informed-based trading computed by Easley,
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), dispersion is analysts’ forecast dispersion, |Ret| is the average absolute return during the estimation period, |RetMkt| the market’s
mean absolute return, Ln(Size) is the log of average market capitalization, Analysts is the number of analysts covering the stock and µ(ret) the estimation-period
average return. P-values reported between brackets controls for heteroscedasticity using Froot (1989)’s adjustment and clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
|Ret| + 15.295 15.403 15.336 11.032
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
|RetMkt| + 11.338 9.546 9.592 10.562
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
DPIN + -0.637
[0.00]
PIN - -5.171 -5.324 -4.184 -4.030 -2.045 -1.808
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Dispersion + 0.387 4.282 6.121 7.635 8.599 17.186 6.064
[0.64] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Disp*PIN - -42.618
[0.00]
Ln(Size) + -0.008 -0.006 0.062
[0.55] [0.67] [0.00]
Analysts (÷100) + 2.667 2.662 3.321
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constant ? -0.731 -1.618 -0.728 -0.180 -1.282 -1.963 -2.028 -2.350
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Obs. 20,403 20,403 20,403 20,403 19,945 19,945 19,945 43,307
R
2 10.04% 0.00% 10.36% 16.02% 18.16% 22.11% 22.17% 23.91%
N
o. of ﬁrms 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,704 2,704 2,704 7,195
Year Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4
2Table 3: Turnover Around Earnings Announcements
This table reports results of OLS regressions of turnover around earnings announcements events taken from I/B/E/S in the 1984–2002 period. The dependent
variable is the average log turnover on the [-2,+2] days period around announcements. Under the Sign column I show the predicted signs for each variable. DPIN
is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has a PIN estimate for the previous year. PIN is the probability of informed-based trading computed by Easley,
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), dispersion is analysts’ forecast dispersion, |Ret| is the average absolute return during the estimation period, |RetMkt| the market’s
mean absolute return, Ln(Size) is the log of average market capitalization, Analysts is the number of analysts covering the stock and µ(ret) the estimation-period
average return. P-values reported between brackets controls for heteroscedasticity using Froot (1989)’s adjustment and clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
|Ret| + 18.973 19.028 19.005 16.209
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
|RetMkt| + 2.947 2.511 2.504 2.707
[0.11] [0.16] [0.16] [0.06]
DPIN + -0.662
[0.00]
PIN - -4.474 -4.591 -3.345 -3.391 -1.681 -1.397
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Dispersion + -0.096 3.263 5.588 6.060 6.715 16.984 3.539
[0.90] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Disp*PIN - -50.986
[0.00]
Ln(Size) + -0.019 -0.016 0.040
[0.18] [0.26] [0.00]
Analysts (÷100) + 2.540 2.534 3.254
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constant ? -0.605 -1.370 -0.603 0.034 -1.335 -1.875 -1.953 -0.768
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.57] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Obs. 20,403 20,403 20,403 20,403 19,937 19,937 19,937 43,285
R
2 6.90% -0.01% 7.07% 13.29% 19.74% 22.71% 22.80% 27.00%
N
o. of ﬁrms 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,704 2,704 2,704 7,194
Year Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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3Table 4: Difference between Turnover Around and Turnover Before Announcements
This table reports OLS regression results of turnover difference between the periods around and before earnings announcements events taken
from I/B/E/S in the 1984–2002 period for which there are PIN estimates available. The dependent variable is the difference in average daily log
turnover before and around an earnings announcement. Trading before comprises average turnover for the [-10,-3] period before announcements
and tradingarounduses turnoverfor the [-2,2]periodaroundannouncements. Underthe Sign columnI show the predictedsigns for each variable.
DPIN is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has a PIN estimate for the previous year. PIN is the probability of informed-based trading
computed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), dispersion is analysts’ forecast dispersion, |Ret| is the average absolute return during the
estimation period, |RetMkt| the market’s mean absolute return, Ln(Size) is the log of average market capitalization, Analysts is the number of
analysts covering the stock and µ(ret) the estimation-period average return. P-values reported between brackets controls for heteroscedasticity
using Froot (1989)’s adjustment and clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
|Ret| + 15.357 15.330 15.332 12.489
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
|RetMkt| + 10.562 10.286 10.279 9.345
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
DPIN - -0.030
[0.00]
PIN + 0.700 0.735 0.839 0.661 0.368 0.419
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Dispersion + -0.446 -0.984 -0.510 -1.345 -1.705 0.155 -2.445
[0.21] [0.01] [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.93] [0.00]
Disp*PIN - -9.239
[0.32]
Ln(Size) - -0.013 -0.012 -0.024
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
Analysts (÷100) - -0.108 -0.109 -0.036
[0.12] [0.12] [0.52]
Constant ? 0.125 0.247 0.124 0.213 -0.062 0.093 0.079 0.306
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.04] [0.09] [0.00]
Obs. 20,403 20,403 20,403 20,403 19,937 19,937 19,937 43,282
R
2 0.49% 0.01% 0.53% 1.47% 17.47% 17.60% 17.61% 15.11%
N
o. of ﬁrms 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,704 2,704 2,704 7,193
Year Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4
4Table 5: Estimated Impact on Stock Turnover
This table contains estimated changes in abnormal turnover measures given one standard deviation increases
fromthemeanforPIN, analystforecastdispersionandanalyst coverage. PanelA containsresults forturnover
before announcements, Panel B uses turnover around announcements and Panel C the changes on the differ-
ence between average turnoverafter and before events. The sample is comprised by earnings announcements
events from I/B/E/S in the 1984–2002 period for which there are PIN estimates available. Under column β,
I list the parameters in column 6 from tables 2, 3 and 4 for each respective variable, µ displays means and σ
standard deviations. ∆(σ) shows change in terms of dependent variables’ standard deviations, while ∆(%)
changes in terms of percentage changes with respect to the average of the dependent variable. LB and UB
represent 95% lower and upper conﬁdence intervals.
Panel A: Turnover Before
Variable β µ σ ∆(σ) ∆(%) LB: ∆(%) UB: ∆(%)
PIN -2.045 0.171 0.055 -0.125 -6.98% -8.59% -5.36%
Dispersion 8.599 0.006 0.012 0.117 6.49% 5.31% 7.67%
Analysts 2.667 12.255 10.000 0.297 16.51% 13.72% 0.41%
Panel B: Turnover Around
Variable β µ σ ∆(σ) ∆(%) LB: ∆(%) UB: ∆(%)
PIN -1.681 0.171 0.055 -0.099 -6.76% -8.70% -4.82%
Dispersion 6.715 0.006 0.012 0.087 5.98% 4.53% 7.42%
Analysts 2.540 12.255 10.000 0.271 18.54% 15.12% 0.41%
Panel C: Turnover Difference
Variable β µ σ ∆(σ) ∆(%) LB: ∆(%) UB: ∆(%)
PIN 0.368 0.171 0.055 0.037 8.29% 4.08% 12.50%
Dispersion -1.705 0.006 0.012 -0.038 -8.50% -12.18% -4.83%
Analysts -0.108 12.255 10.000 -0.020 -4.40% -10.00% 0.02%
45Table 6: Testing for sample-selection bias due to PIN availability
Panel A reports statistics of ﬁrms with and without PIN estimates, using CRSP and I/B/E/S earnings announcements
data between 1983-2002. The third column tests whether means are statistically signiﬁcant. An ‘*’ denotes signiﬁcance
at the 1% level. In Panel B, I report regression results based on the Heckman (1979) two-step model to account for
sample-selection. The probit equation uses PIN-availability as the dependent variable. Age is based on the ﬁrst year of
stock data availability in CRSP, Dispersion is analysts’ forecast dispersion, Analysts is the number of analysts covering
the stock, Inst. Ownership is the fraction of the ﬁrm owned by institutional investors based on 13f Holdings data, Number
of Inst. is the number of institutional investors owners, Ln(Size) is the log of average market capitalization and σ(ret)
the standard deviation of return during the 200-day estimation period. Speciﬁcation under “Heckman model” use stock
turnover measures as dependent variables and the inverse-Mills ratio (λ) is computed from the ﬁrst-step probit model.
P-values are reported between brackets.
Panel A: Differences between no-PIN and PIN ﬁrms
No-PIN sample PIN sample Difference in means
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. No-PIN minus PIN
Before 18,936 -1.17 1.26 19,690 -1.62 0.90 0.45*
Around 18,938 -0.82 1.30 19,690 -1.37 0.93 0.55*
Diff 18,936 0.35 0.74 19,690 0.25 0.55 0.10*
Dispersion 18,938 0.59 1.30 19,690 0.56 0.01 0.04*
Size 18,938 1,626 13,355 19,690 3,448 9,739 -1822*
Panel B: Heckman two-step model
Probit Model Heckman Model
Dependent Variable DPIN Before Around Diff
Dispersion 13.644 |Ret| 15.647 18.894 15.269
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Ln(Size) 0.163 |RetMkt| 10.053 2.539 10.228
[0.00] [0.00] [0.19] [0.00]
Analysts (÷100) 1.762 PIN -2.190 -1.862 0.327
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 0.027 Dispersion 9.089 7.267 -1.635
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Inst. Ownership 0.479 Ln(Size) 0.004 -0.004 -0.009
[0.00] [0.61] [0.57] [0.03]
Number of Inst. Investors -0.003 Analysts (÷100) 2.652 2.522 -0.111
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.12]
σ(ret) -16.891 Constant -1.896 -1.719 0.196
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Market Turnover 1.867 λ 0.174 0.216 0.048





Obs. 38,093 38,101 38,093 38,093
Pseudo R2 63.42% Adjusted R2 21.98% 21.61% 17.60%
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
46Table 7: Robustness Checks - Quarterly data and Alternative Event Window
This table regress turnovermeasures on proxies for differences of opinion and information asymmetry, using
earnings announcements data taken from I/B/E/S in the 1984–2002 period for which there are PIN estimates
available. Panel A reports results using quarterly data, where “Before” uses turnover for the [-10,-3] period
before announcements. “Around” uses the [-2,2] period around the event and “Diff” equals Around-Before.
In Panel B, I change the calculation of dependent variables and deﬁne “Before” as turnover for the [-10,-2]
period before announcements and “Around” as [-1,1] days-period around the event. PIN is the probability of
informed-based trading computed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), dispersion is analysts’ forecast
dispersion, |Ret| is the average absolute return during the estimation period, |RetMkt| the market’s mean
absolute return, Ln(Size) is the log of average market capitalization, Analysts is the number of analysts
covering the stock and µ(ret) the estimation-period average return. P-values reported between brackets in
Panel A controls for heteroscedasticity using Froot (1989)’s adjustment and clustered at the ﬁrm level. In
Panel B they are based on 500 bootstrap replications.
Panel A: Quarterly Data Panel B: [-1,1] “Around” window
Variable Before Around Diff Before Around Diff
|Ret| 11.941 17.024 15.482 15.578 16.504 13.369
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
|RetMkt| 8.642 3.242 8.102 9.466 3.002 9.557
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00]
PIN -1.511 -1.225 0.269 -2.037 -1.548 0.487
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Dispersion 22.155 18.748 -3.159 8.624 6.157 -2.189
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Ln(Size) -0.030 -0.053 -0.025 -0.008 -0.026 -0.020
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.55] [0.07] [0.00]
Analysts (÷100) 4.668 4.950 0.322 2.657 2.568 -0.050
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.52]
Constant -1.699 -1.323 0.273 -1.961 -0.374 0.387
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Obs. 64,626 64,605 64,604 19,945 19,857 19,857
R
2 22.06% 24.01% 18.02% 21.93% 22.69% 17.75%
N
o. of ﬁrms 2,589 2,589 2,589 2,704 2,701 2,701
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
47Table 8: Robustness Checks - Split Sample
This table regress turnovermeasures on proxies for differences of opinion and information asymmetry, using
annual earnings announcements data taken from I/B/E/S in the 1984–2002 period for which there are PIN
estimatesavailable. PanelA showsresults forthe1984-1993period,whilePanelB usesdatafrom1994-2002.
“Before” uses turnover for the [-10,-3] period before announcements in excess of mean turnover calculated
for the estimation-period. “Around” uses the [-2,2] period around the event and “Diff” equals Around-
Before. PIN is the probabilityof informed-basedtrading computedby Easley, Hvidkjaer,and O’Hara (2002),
dispersion is analysts’ forecast dispersion, |Ret| is the average absolute return during the estimation period,
|RetMkt| the market’s mean absolute return, Ln(Size) is the log of average market capitalization, Analysts is
the number of analysts coveringthe stock and µ(ret) the estimation-periodaverage return. P-values reported
between brackets controls for heteroscedasticity using Froot (1989)’s adjustment and clustered at the ﬁrm
level.
Panel A: 1984-1993 Panel B: 1994-2002
Variable Before Around Diff Before Around Diff
|Ret| 17.884 20.115 18.353 14.003 18.433 13.763
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
|RetMkt| 16.283 6.852 16.118 1.762 -1.607 5.580
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.54] [0.57] [0.00]
PIN -2.048 -1.854 0.206 -2.029 -1.523 0.508
[0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Dispersion 9.071 7.785 -1.207 6.201 2.489 -3.371
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.12] [0.00]
Ln(Size) -0.039 -0.048 -0.012 0.004 -0.010 -0.016
[0.04] [0.02] [0.14] [0.78] [0.52] [0.01]
Analysts (÷100) 2.752 2.565 -0.165 2.889 2.828 -0.027
[0.00] [0.00] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.77]
Constant -1.776 -1.669 0.106 -0.811 -0.863 0.238
[0.00] [0.00] [0.11] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Obs. 9,420 9,413 9,413 10,525 10,524 10,524
R
2 16.10% 15.70% 17.36% 21.48% 22.46% 18.67%
N
o. of ﬁrms 1,649 1,649 1,649 2,326 2,326 2,326
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
48 
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Figure 1: A summary of the time line of events in the model.
49Figure 2: Abnormal Stock Turnover around Earnings Announcements
This graph shows abnormal turnover of earnings announcements events in the 1984–2002 period from the
I/B/E/S database. Abnormal turnover is deﬁned as the difference between daily turnover and the estimation-
periodaverage. The estimation-periodcomprisest=-80to t=-11days beforethe event. Turnovermeasures are
winsorized at the 1% level. The sample is split between ﬁrms with and without estimates for the probability
of information-basedtrading (PIN).
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